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Abstract 
Perception of self and others' mental states has attracted vast attention in social cognitive neuroscience. The purpose of the 
present study is to compare the ability of perceiving self and others' mental states and mindfulness. “Reading the Mind from 
Eyes” test, with pictures of self and others' eyes, and Mindful Attention Scale were used to evaluate the participants’ ability of 
“mentalizing” and “mindfulness”. Findings have shown that there is a correlation between self and others' mind-reading abilities, 
and between self-mind-reading ability and mindfulness. Based on our findings, we can consider self as a part of social 
environment.
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
 An important part of our mental and cognitive lives relies on effective interaction with others in our social world. 
Human being is born in society and needs social interactions. These social transactions are the foundation of our 
happiness and social well-being. Perception of self and other mental states is an important factor of success in social 
interactions. The main question in this domain is whether we use similar processes in inferring self and other mental 
states. This sort of questions have led to the emergence of a distinct intradiscipline named social cognitive 
neuroscience, which combines theories and methods of its parent disciplines, namely, social psychology and 
cognitive neuroscience, to understand the ability of effectively navigating the social world (Ochsner & Lieberman, 
2001). This field probes social phenomena in three levels: social communications level (experience and behaviour), 
cognitive level (information process mechanisms), and neural level (brain imaging) (Ochsner, 2004). Several factors 
contribute to its development: research equipments, which make unobtrusive measurements of brain activities 
possible (such as functional neuroimaging methods); evidence about the role of social power in brain development; 
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and, finally, the emergence of research interdisciplinary centres for cognitive neuroscientists and social 
psychologists (Ochsner & Lieberman, 2001). Social cognition is an important domain in the field of social cognitive 
neuroscience. It’s the ability to represent self and other’s mental states, relationship between self and other and 
relationship among other individuals in social context. Overall, social cognition consists of cognitive processes that 
help us navigate the social world. First component of social cognition is processes needed to perceive others. On the 
other hand, self is the second component of social cognition. In other words, perception of self is a vital part of 
social cognition (Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 2001; Bar-On, Tranel, Denburg, & Bechara, 2003). In fact, the 
individual use “self” as a cognitive mediate to effectively perceive others. As an example, in many cases, we 
consciously or unconsciously use our own experience and introspection to probe into emotions and intentions of 
others (Meltzoff & Brooks, 2001). Social cognitive neuroscience examines neural mechanisms underlying social 
cognition processes (Adolphs, 2003). According to Tomasello (2000), human evolve a special kind of social 
cognition which helps them to consider other specifics as beings that have mental lives like themselves (Ochsner, 
2004). The ability of social cognition enables individuals to imagine themselves in “others shoes”. Therefore, 
considering our own mental status is a powerful source of information to interpret others mental status. Self-
awareness considered as an anchor to perceive the other in social interactions. On the other hand, vast evidence from 
neurological, social psychology and developmental psychology support the view of common but not exactly 
identical representation networks between self and other (Ochsner & Lieberman, 2001). 
 Representation of self and other activate brain regions responsible for processing information regarding 
emotions, traits and intentions. Furthermore, self-perception and other-presentation involve brain regions including 
superior temporal sulci (STS), anterior insula (AI), amygdale and posterior cingulated cortex (PCC) that are 
responsible for emotion and social cognition (Pelphrey, Morris, & McCarthy, 2004). On the other hand, inferior 
parietal cortex and prefrontal cortex in the right hemisphere are involved in intrapersonal awareness (Ochsner & 
Lieberman, 2001). Mindfulness is a kind of self-regulation that includes emphasizing a non-judgmental, non-
discursive awareness of one’s perceptions, sensations, thoughts, and emotions. Mindfulness is different from self-
awareness and it influences on behaviour on a different way. Self-awareness prepares one’s status that automatically 
leads to comparison of the self against standards (Silvia & Duval, 2001) and efforts to change behaviour. In contrast, 
mindful awareness involves acceptance of whatever is observed, even discrepancies (Evans, Baer, Segerstrom, 
2009). Fundamentals of this concept can be traced back to ancient Buddhist texts (Falkenstrom, 2010). Some 
researchers define mindfulness as “a receptive attention to and awareness of present event and experience” (Brown, 
Ryan, & Creswell, 2007). Mindful individuals perceive internal and external realities freely and without distortion 
and have great ability to face with a wide range of thoughts, emotions and experiences (pleasant or unpleasant) 
(Ryan & Brown, 2003; Brown et al., 2007). This cognitive construct should be differentiated from self-awareness 
and self-focused attention. Similarity of these constructs is increased attention to mental experiences but the 
difference lies on their cognitive aspect. It means that attention in self-awareness is affected with biases of self-
focused thinking and is accompanied with self- judgment but mindfulness is an attention without bias and judgment 
of self. Mindfulness has a positive relationship with mental and psychological wellbeing and mental health but self- 
awareness is related to lower level of psychological wellbeing (Brown & Kasser, 2005; Brown et al., 2007; 
Falkenstrom, 2010).  
One of the reasons for increasing medical and psychological research about mindfulness is its ability to identify 
new dimensions of mind and body relationship. Research is mostly focused on assessing effectiveness of 
mindfulness based interventions. There are different mindfulness based interventions that are used in practice but 
two principal strategies are mindfulness based reduction (MBSR) (Kabat-zinn, 2003) and mindfulness based 
cognitive therapy (MBCT) (Mars & Abbey, 2010). Mindfulness based stress reduction programme increases 
mindfulness and wellbeing and decreases stress and its physical and psychological symptoms significantly. MBCT 
is an integration of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) and MBSR and is designed to empower patients in 
remission from recurrent periods of major depression (Segal, Williams & Teasdale, 2002). Time consumed in 
formal meditation exercises like Yoga is related to enhancement of mindfulness and wellbeing. So mindfulness is 
considered as a mediating factor to increase psychological functioning and decrease stress symptoms that are due to 
meditation exercises. This treatment had a positive effect in individuals with eating disorder especially Bulimia and 
mood change of patients with cancer (Carmody & Baer, 2008). Mindfulness based cognitive therapy is a programme 
to prevent relapse of depression symptoms (especially unipolar depression) and combines cognitive therapy with 
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meditation (with emphasis on mindfulness) (Segal et al., 2002). Effectiveness of this therapeutic approach is 
confirmed in individuals with bipolar disorder (Weber et al., 2010).  
The purpose of present study was to compare the ability of perceiving self and other mental states and to examine 
relationship of these abilities with mindfulness.  
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
Static population is this study is all psychology students in Tehran University. Forty undergraduate students (20 
female, 20 male) participated in the present study. Participants age range was 18-25 (mean = 21.5). All participants 
gave informed consent prior to participate in the study. 
2.2. Instrument 
The following methods were used: 
2.2.1. Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) 
“Reading the mind in the eyes” task is a neurocognitive test to evaluate participant’s ability of “mind-reading”. 
This test was developed by Baron-Cohen in 2001 (Baron-Cohen Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) and 
consists of 36 photographs of the eye-region of actors and actresses in different mental statuses. For each 
photograph, 4 mental states correspond with the mental status (figure 1). Only one of these 4 words is the correct 
one which best describe what the person in the photograph is thinking or feeling. This test had been designed to 
assess the ability to attribute the mental states of self and another person (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). 
 The participants were asked to choose the best answer based on the visual information of the photograph. 
Maximum point for each participant is 36 and minimum point is 0. This neuropsychological test has been used in 
many studies of mind reading in patients and healthy individuals (Wang, Wang, Chen, Zhu, & Wang, 2008). In 
order to effectively translate the mental statues attributes from English to Persian, the authors consulted and used 
advices of some linguists. 
Despondent         Relieved           Shy            Excited 
Figure 1. An example of a (male) stimulus Used. The correct word choice is despondent
2.2.2 “Reading the Mind in the Own Eyes” Test 
Another version of “Reading the mind from eyes” was prepared for this study. In this version, instead of using 
the photographs of actors and actresses, 45 photographs of the person’s eye-region in different mental states were 
prepared and presented to them based on the original version (figure 2). 
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Embarrassed         Fantasizing        Confused            Panicked 
Figure 2. An example of a (male) stimulus Used. The correct word choice was fantasizing
2.2.3. Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS) 
Ryan and Brown (2003) made this scale. It has 15 questions to assess levels of awareness and attention to events 
and experiences of daily life. Construct of mindfulness is assessed with a six graded scale of Likert. This scale gives 
an overall score for mindfulness with a range of 15 to 90. Higher score indicates more mindfulness. Internal 
consistency of questions is reported from 0.80 to 0.87 in some researches (Ryan & Brown, 2003; Carlson & Brown, 
2005; Ghorbani, Watson, & Weathington, 2009). Reliability coefficient of retest in this scale in one month period is 
reported to be stable (Ryan & Brown, 2003). Alpha coefficient for Persian questions of this scale in a sample of 723 
students is 0.81 (Ghorbani et al., 2009).
2.3. Procedure
Participants had given written consent to participate in this study. A series of 45 attributes describing different 
mental states were presented to them. The researcher explained the semantic of each adjective to the participant, 
induced the related mental states and asked participants to show it in their faces. After being prepared, photographs 
were taken from the eye-region of the participant.  
45 photographs were prepared for each participant and a version of “mind reading in the own eyes test” 
(corresponding with the original version) was designed using 36 photographs of his/her own. After two weeks, the 
researchers administrated the made version on the participants. They were asked to judge which of the 4 adjectives 
best describe their own mental states. Correlation was evaluated with Pearson's correlation test. 
3. Results 
Forty students of psychology in Tehran University (mean age = 21.55, SD = 2.15) were recruited in this study. 
Participants’ demographic data are shown in table 1.  
 Table 1. Participants’ demographic data
Percent nvariable 
sex
50 20       female 
50 20       male 
Educational level 
85 34     undergraduate 
15 6   Postgraduate 
Marital Status 
97.5 39     single 
2.5 1    married 
0.91 17.21 Average (mean-SD)
2.15 21.55 Age (mean-SD)
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Table 2 shows the correlation between variables. The findings show correlation between perception of self and 
others mental states. 
Table 2. Correlation between variables
pNumber Pearson rVariables 
0.025 
0.014 
0.09 
40 
40 
40 
0.353 
0.386 
0.278 
Self Mind Reading Grade-Others Mind Reading Grade 
Mindfulness Grade- Self Mind Reading Grade 
Mindfulness Grade-Others Mind Reading Grade 
Figure 3. Correlation between variables 
4. Conclusion 
   Results show that there is a significant correlation between perception of self and other’s mental states. 
Previous findings reveals that similar behavioural neural pathway is engaged when doing, watching someone else 
doing or even imagining a kind of behaviour (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Gallese, Keysers, & 
Rizzolatti, 2004; Grimshaw, Sitarenios, & Finegan, 1995; Hess & Pickett, 2010). Imaging studies show that some 
cortical areas including the medial prefrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex and the precuneus are involved in 
self-processing (Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004) and social cognition (Schilbach, 2006). Furthermore, a right-
lateralized frontoparietal network that overlaps with mirror-neuron areas is involved in self recognition (Uddin, 
2005) and social understanding (Gallese et al., 2004). 
Activities of midline structures of brain are related to social or psychological aspects of the self, such as self-
referential judgments (Gusnard et al., 2001), self-appraisal (Ochsner et al., 2005) and judgments of personality traits 
(Lou et al., 2004; Kelley, Macrae, Wyland, Inati, & Heatherton, 2002). In addition cortical midline structures are 
also involved in the processing of social relationships (Schilbach, 2006; Iacoboni et al., 2005) and recognizing 
personally familiar others (Gobbini, Leibenluft, Santiago, & Haxby, 2004). Studies that show midline activations 
during understanding of social interactions between others (Iacoboni et al., 2005) or ascribing social traits to others 
(impression formation) (Mitchell, Heatherton, & Macrea, 2002) typically require subjects to reference the mental 
state of others. Medial prefrontal cortex is involved in theory of mind or mental-state attribution (Frith & Frith, 
1999). Therefore, these midline structures are involved in representing both self and others and processing 
information about the mental states of others (Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2005). Some researchers show that 
internally oriented processes that focus on one’s own or others’ mental states mediate by cortical midline structures, 
whereas externally focused processes based on one’s own or others’ visible features and actions mediate by lateral 
Self Mind Reading Others Mind 
Reading
Mindfulness 
r = .353 
353
p = .025 
r= .278 
p= .09 p = .014 
r = .386 
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frontoparietal networks (Lieberman, 2007). As a result, we can conclude that the self is used as an anchorage to 
perceive meaningful others. Behavioral research suggests that individuals use themselves as template or anchor to 
infer others mental states. This overlap is attested by people’s amazing ability to quickly infer and learn from others 
intentions and mental states in social interactions (Adolphs et al., 2001; Bar-On et al., 2003). 
This kind of inferring and learning would be possible when we consider others operate in the same way we do 
(Tomasello, 2000). Also, neuroimaging research has shown that individuals use overlapping mechanisms when 
mediating self-perception and other-perception to understand what other people feel or intend in social context. 
(Todorov, Fiske, & Prentice, 2011). On the other hand, by discovering mirror neuron, studies show that observing 
and doing activity trigger same brain regions in monkeys (Adolphs, 2003). Furthermore, human neuroimaging 
studies show that observing motor activity activates parietal and premotor cortex (Buccino et al., 2001, Iacoboni et 
al., 2005; Iacoboni, 2006). Mirror neuron study shows that similar structures are involved in doing and observing 
activity. These mechanisms explain different social cognitive activity such as empathy and imitation (Buccino, 
2001). Based on the literature, the brain regions responsive to motor representation of self and other are overlapping. 
Motor theories of social cognition and empathy based on the concept of motor neurons shows that social cognitive 
abilities are mediated by the fast, automatic, bottom-up activation of the representation of the mental states that 
perceivers see in others. When one is engaged in an action or sees someone else doing that, these representations are 
overlapping or shared (Gallese et al., 2004). 
Our findings show that mindfulness is correlated to self mind reading but not to other mind reading. Mindfulness 
entails self-regulation of attention to concentrate on the present (Bishop et al., 2004). Thoughts, feelings, and bodily 
sensations are considered to be objects which one should observe but not something on which one should elaborate 
(i.e., direct attention toward thinking about the thought, feeling, or sensation) (Giluk, 2009). Mindfulness also 
involves one’s orientation to experience (Bishop et al., 2004). Mindfulness is a non-judging, non-identifying 
attitude, thoughts, feelings, and sensations are observed as they follow a natural course in experience. In other 
words, mindfulness is a passive observation of one’s inner experience. Therefore, mindfulness prepares an 
opportunity for insight to self experience and allows first-hand experiences on how the mind functions. (Hollis-
Walker & Colosimo, 2011) Thus mindfulness is self-centred and is correlated to self mind reading. One factor that 
should be considered in the present study is the cultural identities of the participants. East Asians emphasize on the 
interconnectedness of human beings along with contingencies between the individual’s behaviour and the thoughts 
and actions of others in the relationship (the interdependent self). In contrast, Westerners (North Americans and 
Europeans) tend to view the self as an autonomous entity separated from others, who behave according to their own 
internal attributes and thoughts (the independent self) (Heine, 2001). Therefore, we propose conducting similar 
study in a Western culture to see whether the results correlate with the above findings. 
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